Introduction
The physical location of banks is relevant in determining the terms and availability of banking services. Customers' transportation costs produce spatial differentiation of banks' softening competition [Chiappori et al. (1995) ]. Banks' costs of gathering and processing site-specific information about potential borrowers increase with distance [Almazan (2002) ; Petersen and Rajan (2002) ] so distant banks will be less informed about local credit market conditions than banks closer to the borrowers. 1 Previous research has documented an increase in distant bank lending to small business over time, especially in the US, and has examined its causes [Mester (1997) Advances in credit scoring, and other transactional lending techniques, enlarge the relevant market around a branch and therefore, with fixed costs per branch, we expect to see an increase in the average distance from the branch to customers' locations, and a decrease in the equilibrium number of branches serving the whole territory. In Spain, however, banks expand geographically, opening branches country-wide, and the density of branches per capita remains stable over time. We also provide evidence that loans granted in a province by banks with no branches in that province have been ⎯and continue to be⎯ negligible, while the distance between the location of the headquarters of the bank and the
1.
A distinction is made between soft information, collected by the bank through repeated direct interactions with the firm it does business with, and hard information that is equally available to close and distant lenders. The use of soft versus hard data in lending decisions is more correlated with relational or transactional lending technologies, respectively [Boot (2000) ; Berger and Udell (2002) ]. Dell'Ariccia and Márquez (2004) and Hauswald and Marquez (2006) explicitly model banking competition and interest rate determination, assuming that banks' information on borrowers decreases with distance.
2. The use of collateral is very common in loans to business firms [Berger and Udell (1995) ; Harhoff and Körting (1998); Degryse and van Cayseele (2000) ; Jiménez, Salas and Saurina (2006a) ], and has micro-and macro-economic implications in terms of credit availability [Jiménez, Salas and Saurina (2006b) ] and economic growth [Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) ].
provinces where the loans are granted, increases in parallel to branch expansion. We have no direct evidence as to how the physical distance from firms to the banks they borrow from has evolved over time in Spain but, from other evidence available a relevant research question to ask is how the use of collateral in business loans is affected by the observed increase in organizational distance, namely that between the headquarters of the bank (top decision-making power) and the operating branches serving customers in local markets. 3 We address this research question with a large data-base on individual loans to firms by Spanish banks in the period 1992 to 2002. The data come from the Credit Register of the Banco de España, which contains information on all loans of 6,000 euros or more granted by all Spanish banks, to firms of all sizes, anywhere in the country. The sample data used in the paper includes all loans to firms for which accounting data from the Commercial
Register is available for the year before the loan was granted (almost half a million loans).
Accounting ratios, together with size, and the past loan-defaulting history of the borrower (as reported in the Credit Register), are the kind of hard data that can be used by distant lenders to assess the credit quality of the borrower. For each loan, we know its size, maturity and if it is collateralised or not, but information on the interest rate is not available. The use of collateral is the dependent variable to be explained as a function of the firm-bank we use an alternative proxy for information differences between local and distant banks.
On the other hand, Agarwal and Hauswald (2007) find that controlling for sample-selection bias does not affect their main findings.
Banks can be physically closer to potential borrowers by opening branches in local markets. But whether physical proximity to the customer will reduce the informational advantage of local banks (those with headquarters and decision-making power physically close to the borrower) over organizationally-distant ones (those with headquarters and decision-making power a distance away from the local branch) is an open question.
If the bank centralizes decision-making power to avoid agency and related costs of delegation, then information on the credit quality of the loan application will have to be communicated from the local branch to the bank headquarters. The quality of the centralized decisions will depend on the quality and information content of the data communicated, received and processed. Alternatively, the bank may decide to decentralize the decision on granting the loan, and its terms, to the branch manager, thus avoiding distortions in the communication process, but it then faces agency and related costs of delegation. The two 3. The organizational distance variable is used by Berger and De Young (2001) to measure the distance in miles between the parent and the affiliate in US multi-bank holding companies. They are interested in testing how control of parent over affiliated banks has evolved over time according to advances in new banking technologies. Alessandrini, Presbitero and Zazzaro (2006) refer to functional distance which includes spatial as well as cultural distance between the headquarters of the bank and the province where the bank has branches; they investigate if functional distance affects the credit constraints of firms.
solutions imply organizational diseconomies [Stein (2002) large banks tend to rely more on hard data and transactional lending, while small banks specialise in the use of soft data and relational lending. They explain the different lending practices between small and large banks as a consequence of organizational diseconomies, which force large banks to rely on hard, codified data for internal transmission of information.
When organizational diseconomies are important, the organizational distance becomes the key supply-side factor affecting the terms of loans, independently of whether banks have branches in the local market or not. In testing the hypothesis from the lender-based theory of collateral, we use organizational distance as a proxy for information differences about local market conditions among competing banks.
We find that organizational distance is a relevant variable in explaining the use of collateral for business loans, in two ways. First, the likelihood of the use of collateral decreases with organizational distance, and the effects of the distance variable on such likelihood are independent of the experience of the bank in the province. Second, the effect of organizational distance on the likelihood of collateral, decreases when the accounting variables (hard data), which refer to the credit quality of the firm, are included as explanatory variables of the use of collateral. Therefore, the empirical evidence supports the notion that organizational diseconomies affect the lending decisions of banks, and
shows that hard data and organizational distance are, somehow, substitutes in the collateral decision. These results are in line with those of Agarwal and Hauswald (2007) , who find that firm-bank physical distance is no longer statistically significant in explaining the interest rate of the loan, after controlling for banks' soft proprietary information on the credit quality of the borrower. This is interpreted as evidence that firm-bank proximity is a source of local informational advantage for the bank. On the other hand, we find that distant lenders can offset their informational disadvantage when hard data is available to assess the credit quality of the borrower.
We also find that, controlling for the credit quality of the borrower, the effect of organizational distance on the use of collateral for loans differs as a function of observable characteristics of the firm, such as age and size: the likelihood of collateral increases with organizational proximity (the opposite to organizational distance) in loans granted to older and larger firms, while it decreases with proximity in loans granted to younger and smaller firms.
This evidence is consistent with the lender-based theory of collateral, which predicts that local lenders are more likely to ask for collateral for loans granted with lower informational advantage, which is expected to be the case among larger and older firms, for whom more public information will be available.
Another finding of the paper is that the likelihood of the use of collateral decreases with concentration in the credit market, but it does so at a lower rate in loans granted to borrowers with longer-standing relationships with the lender. Competition is expected to be lower as the credit market becomes more concentrated. The lender-based theory of collateral predicts that local lenders will use collateral to collect rents from borrowers that have higher reservation profits, i. e. they obtain higher profits by getting the loan from a distant bank.
In more concentrated (less competitive) markets, reservation profits are expected to be lower, and therefore less use of collateral is expected ⎯a prediction corroborated by the empirical evidence. There are, however, other explanations of the use of collateral as a function of credit market competition, consistent with this evidence. The unique prediction from the lender-based theory of collateral is that the effect of higher reservation profit on the decision to use collateral is less, the higher the informational advantage of the local lender. Longer duration of the firm-bank relationship is expected to increase the informational advantage of the lender, so the estimated positive cross-effect of market concentration and duration variables on the likelihood of collateral supports the prediction from the lender-based theory of collateral. The paper contributes to the literature in two significant ways. First, it provides the first direct evidence on how organizational distance affects the use of collateral to secure bank loans to firms, which helps to explain why organizational diseconomies induce banks to specialize in different lending technologies for local and for distant borrowers. Second, the paper is the first to empirically test the predictions from the lender-based theory of collateral, the only one that explains the use of collateral solely as the result of informational advantages of local lenders, and the threat of distant lenders to challenge them, taking advantage of technological developments in transactional lending.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the main hypothesis to be tested, drawn from the lender-based theory of collateral. Section 3 contains the data sources, the description of the observable variables and the formulation of the empirical model. Section 4 presents the results of the empirical analysis, including a description of the time evolution of organizational distance in lending in Spain. The discussion of main findings and conclusions closes the paper. Firm-bank distance and use of collateral for loans
The "lender-based" theory of collateral [Inderst and Mueller (2007) ] explains why loans will be secured with collateral as a consequence of the heterogeneity of lenders in the same credit market. On the contrary, the "borrower-based" theory explains collateral as a function of information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders about the credit risk of the loan.
In borrower-based explanations of collateral, all banks in the same relevant market face similar information asymmetries, while lender-based theories assume that there are two different banks, one local close to the borrower, and other distant from the borrower.
The relevance of being a local or a distant bank is that the former has an informational advantage over the later. As banks expand geographically, by opening branches/subsidiaries in remote markets, they become larger and more complex. The empirical evidence shows that their operating efficiency is inversely related to the average distance from headquarters to operating units [Berger and DeYoung (2001 and 2006) ]. Senior management of the bank will try to minimize such inefficiencies, and will take action to respond to the distorted incentives of branch managers in transmitting private information to the bank headquarters, especially when information is soft and non-codified [Stein (2002) [Berger et al. (2005) ]. Under these circumstances, branch managers will not be motivated to invest in soft information, which will not be used because they do not have the decision-making power to grant the loan, or because the information cannot be effectively communicated to the central loan officer.
On the other hand, bank owners can create powerful incentives for organizationally distant branch managers to collect hard data, which can be internally communicated at low cost, by committing to funding the loans that originated such data [Stein (2002) ].
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Organizational diseconomies will then favor the use of hard data, and more formal communication, between branch managers who collect the relevant information on the loan application, and the distant officers who will make the final decision.
As organizational distance increases, it is more likely that the loan will be processed using transactional lending technologies, which in turn implies that the loan is granted to safe and highly transparent borrowers, i.e. those borrowers for whom the loan is less likely to be c) The effect of organizational distance on the likelihood of collateral is the same for any level of experience of the bank in the local market.
Distance, use of collateral and characteristics of firms
Comparative static analysis from the main result of the lender-based theory of collateral provides further empirically testable predictions. Inderst and Mueller (2007) show that, if the theory is correct, one will observe a higher likelihood of collateral for loans to borrowers with ex ante credit risk than for loans to borrowers with low credit risk. They also show that the proportion of loans with ex post default will be higher among loans with collateral than among loans with no collateral. Jiménez, Salas and Saurina (2006) provide empirical evidence that supports this first prediction, and Jiménez and Saurina (2004) confirm that collateralized loans are ex post riskier than non-collateralized loans. However, the two empirical evidences are also consistent with borrower-based theories of collateral, assuming problems of adverse 4. Agarwal and Hauswald (2007) report that, in the bank they get the data from, credit decisions reside with branches, i.e. their credit decisions are highly decentralized. It is expected that banks will differ in their decentralization policies.
selection and moral hazard in the borrower-lender relationship [Boot, Thakor and
The impossibility of separating predictions on the use of collateral from lender-and borrower-based theories of collateral occurs with other observable variables, such as the duration of the firm-bank relationship, and credit market concentration. Longer duration of the firm-bank relationship will implies higher informational advantage for the bank that grants the loan, and the lender-based theory predicts a lower likelihood of collateral in longer than in shorter relationships. But the duration of the relationship also supports mutual trust, and attenuates the problems of moral hazard originating from information asymmetry [Boot and Thakor (1994) ]. 6 In more concentrated credit markets, the reservation profit of the borrower will be lower, since competition is less intense. Therefore, from the lender-based theory, the use of collateral is less likely in more concentrated credit markets. The informational advantage of the local lender will be higher when lending to more opaque borrowers, since organizationally distant banks do not have reliable hard data (public information) for those borrowers to evaluate their credit risk. If organizationally distant banks can collect hard data for older and larger firms, but not for opaque, younger and smaller firms, then the informational advantage of the local lender will occur mostly among younger and smaller firms. The lender-based theory of collateral will predict that the likelihood of collateral for loans granted by local lenders will be higher than the likelihood of collateral for loans granted by distant lenders, within the groups of borrowers where the informational advantage of the former is lower, i.e., when lending to older and larger firms.
The duration of the borrower-lender relationship is expected to increase the private information on the borrower collected by the lender. But the same duration is expected to translate into higher informational advantage for loans granted by local lenders than for loans granted by distant ones, because the lender-borrower relationship produces private and soft information that flows ⎯with difficulty⎯ through long communication channels. Age and size of the firm imply more public knowledge, and hence more uniform information, for the local as well as the distant lenders who do business with them. Duration, on the other hand, is expected to be positively correlated with more private information, which can be valuable for local banks but not so much so for distant banks (assuming organizational diseconomies). . If information asymmetry is reduced to that which causes adverse selection problems, the prediction is that the use of collateral will be positively associated with the credit quality of the borrower, since use of collateral is a signalling device. 6. Lenders could use their informational advantage to delay borrowers and ask for higher interest rates, and for more use of collateral in loans, compared to those with no information advantage [Sharpe (1990) ; Rajan (1992) ]. In this case, longer borrower-lender relationships imply a higher likelihood of the use of collateral in loans.
For this reason, a longer duration of the borrower-lender relationship is expected to decrease the likelihood of collateral for loans granted by both local and by distant lenders, but more intensively for the former that for the latter. The predictions from propositions 5 and 6 are summarized in the following hypothesis.
H2. a) As organizational proximity of the bank-firm increases, the likelihood of the use of collateral is expected to increase for loans to older and/or larger firms.
b) Longer duration of the lender-borrower relationship is expected to lower the likelihood of collateral in loans granted by all lenders but more intensively in loans granted by local lenders than in loans granted by distant ones.
c) The likelihood of the use of collateral decreases with credit market concentration, but the rate of decrease is lower as the duration of the borrower-lender relationship increases. Data, variables and econometric model
The empirical part of the paper combines two data sets, the Credit Register database of Banco de España (CIR) and the Commercial Register (CR). The CIR provides information on all new loans, above a minimum threshold of 6,000 euros, granted to firms by any Spanish bank. Our sample period runs from 1992 to 2002. For each loan, information is available about type of instrument, currency, collateral, amount, maturity, identity of the borrower, industry, region, identity of the lender, and if the loan is in default at the end of the year or not. 7 However, no information is available on whether collateral is internal or external, nor on the interest rate, nor on the purpose of the loan. Each loan decision is matched with additional characteristics of the borrower; mainly those obtained using the accounting data that the firm reports to the CR, including age of the firm and its industry. There are 50 provinces in Spain, and this is the lowest level of geographic market for which desegregated data is available. Credit market concentration is measured by the Herfindahl index, HERFINDAHLm,t, equal to the sum of squared market shares of business loans granted by each bank in the province m, at the end of the year t.
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From the CIR data we group borrowers into three credit risk categories: those who have a loan in default at the time they receive a new loan, those who do not have a loan in default at the time they receive a new one, but default the following year, and the remaining borrowers. Borrowers in the first group are identified by the dummy variable DEFAULTt-1, which takes the value of 1 if the borrower receiving the loan has any other loan in default, and 0 otherwise. Borrowers who default on a loan in t+1, not having defaults in t-1, are identified by the dummy variable DEFAULTt+1, which takes the value of 1 if the firm defaults (any loan) in t+1but did not have a default in t-1, and 0 otherwise. The remaining borrowers include those who do not default in the year prior to, and in the year after, the loan is granted.
Banks can consult the CIR to learn the credit situation of the borrower at the time the new loan is applied for. Therefore DEFAULTt-1=1 includes all borrowers of observed low credit 7. All banks have access to the total exposure of the borrower in the Spanish banking system at the time the loan is granted. They also know if the firm is in default on any of its existing loans. However, the CIR does not supply historical data on the borrower's previous defaults. Controlling for ex ante risk (using accounting data), the evidence of a higher likelihood of collateral for borrowers with DEFAULTt+1=1, than for borrowers with DEFAULTt+1=0, supports the predictions on use of collateral and credit risk from the lender-based theory of collateral, and from the borrower-based theory when information asymmetry derives from problems of moral hazard. However, when information asymmetry creates problems of adverse selection, and collateral is used to signal high credit quality, then the likelihood of the use of collateral is expected to be higher for borrowers who do not default in t+1, i.e. in higher quality borrowers (see note 4).
AGE of the borrower is the number of years since the firm was created. The intensity of relational lending will be measured by the number of years since the lender granted the first loan to the borrower, DURATION. We use NUMBER OF LENDERS, the number of banks the borrower has loans with at the time the loan is granted, as a control variable, since duration of a given borrower-lender relationship is expected to be different across firms of the same age but who do business with more or fewer banks. We include age of the firm as a proxy for public information about the credit quality of the borrower, and duration as a proxy for private information.
Control variables include also SIZE of the loan, the amount of money lent in thousands of euros; SHORT TERM LOAN, a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the loan is of a maturity between 1 to 3 years, and 0 otherwise. 10 We also control for fixed effects, The full empirical model to be estimated is formulated as follows: (credit risk).
The second block of estimations will include the cross effects, one at a time, for the purpose of testing H2. The predicted signs for the estimated coefficients are β11<0, β13<0
(H2.a), β12>0 (H2.b), β14 >0 (H2.c).
11. For AGE, DISTANCE and DURATION we add 1 before taking logs because these variables can take the value of zero. Results
Summary statistics
Statistics on the variables that provide information about the situation of distant lending in Spain, from 1992 to 2004, are presented in Table I (standard deviation of 6.7). The reason is that the province, our relevance market by assumption, is a larger territory than an MSA. In around 2% of the loans, borrowers had a loan in default at the time of taking a new one, while in 3% of the loans, borrowers with no defaulted loans at the time they were granted a new one, default one or more of the loans 12. The accounting variables have been windsorized, setting the observations above (below) the 95 th (5 th ) percentile at the value of the 95 th (5 th ) percentile to eliminate extreme values that can distort the results. AGE and the NUMBER OF LENDERS have been windsorized in the same way, but only above their 95 th percentile. 13. Average concentration in provincial markets is rather low, and has been relatively stable over time despite intense merger activity. Low concentration and mergers have been compatible, thanks to the geographical expansion of existing banks opening branches across the country, as documented in Table I. in the following year. Since the data sample contains almost 500,000 loans, the sample sizes of loans with DEFAULTt-1=1, and with DEFAULTt+1=1, are around 9,000 and 13,500 observations, respectively. The average age of firms in the sample is 10.7 years, and the average size in terms of total assets is 3.05 million euros. The range of age and size is quite wide, so smaller and younger firms are well represented in the sample.
14 The summary statistics of the accounting variables indicate that the economic and financial situation of the firms in the sample is quite diverse. The average length of the relationship between the borrower and the lender in the sample is 4.22 years, although dispersion in duration is also very high. The average size of the loan represents around 13% of the average assets of the firms in the sample, with high dispersion of values across firms. 43% of the loans in the sample are short-term, with a maturity of 1 to 3 years, and the rest are long-term. The estimated coefficient on Ln DISTANCE is negative and statistically significant in all regressions (H1.a). In Model 1, when borrower and bank-borrower characteristics are excluded from the explanatory variables, the likelihood of collateral in a loan granted in the province where the bank has its headquarters, Ln DISTANCE = 0, is 6.8% higher than the likelihood of collateral in a loan with organizational distance equal to the sample mean of 354 Km (setting all other variables at their sample means). Moreover, as distance increases by 1%, the probability that the loan will be collateralized decreases by 1.1%.
Collateral and organizational distance
Therefore, organizational distance has economic relevance in addition to statistical relevance. Also, in Model 1, the coefficients of the SHARE and of SHARE x Ln DISTANCE are not significantly different from zero (H1.c). If the market share of loans in the province is a measure of knowledge of local market conditions by the bank, the evidence suggests that this knowledge does not affect the decision on collateral. The conjecture posed by the paper, to explain this result, is that organizational diseconomies prevent local information, collected in the local branches, being used by the central loan office of the bank.
Model 2 shows that, when public knowledge on borrowers' characteristics (size, age, accounting ratios, DEFAULTt-1) is added as explanatory of the use of collateral for business loans, the estimated coefficient of Ln DISTANCE, in absolute value, is one-half, and significantly lower than that estimated in Model 1. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that organizational distance relies primarily on hard data for loan granting decisions, and for determining the terms of the loan, i.e., if the loan is secured with collateral or not (H1.b). The addition of further borrower characteristics as explanatory variables, those that are closely related to soft data (DEFAULTt+1 and DURATION), lowers further the estimated coefficient of the distance variable (Model 3). However, the new estimated coefficient in Model 3, for DISTANCE, is not statistically different from that of Model 2.
14. These numbers are in line with those used in other studies, such as Harhoff and Körting (1998) for Germany, and Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Berger and Udell (1995) for the US, although the average size of the firm in our sample is larger since the analysis here is not limited to small firms.
Overall, hypothesis H1 is not rejected by the data. The finding in Table III, 
Other factors explaining the use of collateral

The cross effect of distance and characteristics of firms in the use of collateral
To test the predictions specific to the lender-based theory of collateral, H2, the empirical model must incorporate the cross effect variables, as shown in Table IV (SHARE was excluded, since it appeared to be statistically non-significant). The first estimation, Model 1, adds the cross effect of age and distance. In the new estimation, Ln DISTANCE has a positive estimated coefficient, while the coefficient of the cross effect variable is negative.
other explanatory variables, including accounting ratios, gives correlation values always lower than 4%. We have estimated the model including DEFAULTt+1 x Ln AGE, and DEFAULTt+1 x Ln ASSETS, as additional explanatory variables (one at a time) to evaluate if information in DEFAULTt+1 is affected by the age and size of the firm. In both cases, the coefficient of DEFAULTt+1 now becomes negative, while the coefficient of the cross effect variable is positive. Therefore, for younger and smaller firms, the likelihood of collateral is lower in firms with DEFAULTt+1 =1 than in firms otherwise. This would be consistent with the use of collateral to signal credit quality by younger and smaller firms, those who are expected to know their credit quality much better than do lenders. As firms get older or larger, lenders increase the soft information about the borrower, and the use of collateral is explained by observed risk [see Jiménez, Salas and Saurina (2006a) for further evidence on this issue].
16. Since the effect of credit market competition on loan characteristics in the world of adverse selection and moral hazard affects mainly younger and smaller firms, where information asymmetry between banks and firms is specially high, the model of collateral has been estimated including HERFINDAHL x Ln AGE and HERFINDAHL x Ln ASSETS, one at a time, as additional explanatory variables, to allow for differences in the effect of market competition on the use of collateral according to the age and size of the firm. The combined coefficient of the HERFINDAHL variable in each case is (-0.047 + 0.014 Ln AGE) and (-0.207 + 0.026 Ln ASSETS), respectively (all coefficients statistically significant at 1%). All remaining coefficients of the model are practically unchanged. The hypothesis is confirmed: market concentration affects the use of collateral more significantly among smaller and younger borrowers than among larger or older ones.
The coefficient of the proximity variable (-Ln DISTANCE) is now (-0.031+0.017 Ln AGE), and all estimated coefficients are statistically significant. The negative estimated coefficient of the distance variable, in Table III, indicates that for the sample mean of Ln AGE, organizational proximity between lender and borrower increases the likelihood of collateral for loans.
The result from Table IV indicates that the effect of proximity on the likelihood of collateral is positive for firms of age over 7 years (e 0.031/0.017
) and negative for firms less than 7 years old.
This evidence is consistent with H2.a, which says that proximity positively affects the likelihood of collateral when the loan is granted to more transparent firms (and age is correlated with transparency).
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In Model 2, the cross effect variable is distance times size of the borrower.
As predicted, the sign of the cross effect variable is negative, while the estimated coefficient for the DISTANCE variable changes to positive. Therefore, the coefficient of the proximity variable is now (-0.047+0.007Ln ASSETS). Again, the two coefficients are statistically significant. For the average size of borrowers, proximity increases the likelihood of collateral (Table III) , but the effect of organizational proximity on the likelihood of collateral is positive for larger borrowers (those with assets above 812.5 thousand euros) and negative for smaller ones, as the hypothesis predicts, when differences in size imply differences in informational advantage by closer lenders (H2.a).
When the differences in information between local and distant lenders are captured by the variable duration, the estimated coefficient of duration as a function of distance is (-0.046-0.011 Ln DISTANCE). Now, proximity implies higher a likelihood of collateral as duration increases, which is contrary to what was initially predicted (H2.b). Since this result does not support the lender-based theory of collateral, it deserves additional attention.
One possible explanation for this contradictory result is that local lenders use their information advantage to delay borrowers, and take more time to reduce the collateral requirements of those borrowers observed to be of high quality. Another plausible explanation is that, as indicated above, distant lenders begin their lending relationship with highly transparent borrowers, and therefore learn quite quickly about their true credit quality. Local lenders, on the other hand, begin the relationship with more opaque borrowers and learning about their credit quality takes place more slowly.
The last column of Table IV 17. The estimation of Model 1 can also be formulated in terms of the effect on the likelihood of collateral of an increase in the age of the borrower, for loans granted by local banks, and for loans granted by distant banks. The relevant estimated coefficient is now that of Ln AGE, (0.126 -0.017 Ln DISTANCE). For a loan granted by a local bank (i.e. Ln DISTANCE=0) the marginal increase in the likelihood of collateral, if age of the borrower increases 1%, is 6.8%, while for a loan at the sample average distance of 354Km the marginal increase is 3.0%, a full 56.1% lower. So, an increase in the age of the borrower implies a higher increase in the likelihood of the use of collateral for loans granted by local lenders than for loans granted by distant lenders, consistent with the theory. 18. The coefficient of HERFINDAHL is negative for values of duration lower than 29 years, a value outside the range of sample values of the variable duration.
The lender-based theory of collateral predicts an increase over time in the use of collateral for loans by local lenders whenever advances in availability, transmission and analysis of data increase the efficiency of transactional lending for distant lenders. To see if such increases occurred in our data, the basic model on the determinants of collateral (Model 3, Table IV) is estimated allowing a different time effect for those loans granted by local lenders, DISTANCE=0. The estimated coefficients of the TIME dummy variables from this model, for loans by local lenders and for loans by distant lenders, are represented in Figure 1 .
The evolution over time of the likelihood of collateral for loans granted by local lenders, and for loans granted by distant lenders, controlling for the other explanatory variables, proceeds in parallel. We have no evidence that the pattern of collateral use for loans by local lenders departs in an increasing trend from the use of collateral by distant lenders, as Inderst and
Mueller (2007) conjecture. 19 19. The time stability of the pattern of differences in the use of collateral between local and distant lenders also suggests that the internal control problems within geographically expanded banks remain relatively invariable over time, besides technological advances, which contrasts with the results of Berger and De Young (2001) .
Conclusion
Spain has by far the largest per capita bank branch density among European countries.
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In the past five years, the number of branches has increased at an annual rate above 4%.
Evidence from the US for the same time period indicates that banks have been increasing the use of credit scoring and distant lending technologies in small business lending, so that physical distance in business lending is higher today than it was several years ago. We have no direct data on the use of transactional lending technologies by Spanish banks, nor on the physical distance between the bank branch that processes the loan and the location of the firm that gets the loan, but the geographic expansion of bank branches does not fit well shows that distant lending, and the use of hard data on the borrower in loan decisions, appear to be close substitutes in explaining the use of collateral for loans. This is consistent with the hypothesis that organizational diseconomies in lending will foster specialization of banks in relational and transactional technologies, depending on their comparative advantage: local banks will use more relational lending, and lend to more opaque and informationally complex firms, while distant banks will specialize in transactional technologies and lend to more transparent borrowers. In this respect, we also find that those firms who begin a relationship with a local lender are smaller and younger than those who begin a relationship with a distant lender.
The results of the tests of predictions from the lender-based theory of collateral are mixed. We find evidence that the age of the firm, which can be considered a proxy of information transparency, increases the likelihood of collateral more rapidly for loans from local lenders than for loans from distant lenders. We also find that increases in the informational advantage of lenders (longer duration of the borrower-lender relationship), reduce the likelihood of collateral at a faster pace in less concentrated credit markets (higher COLLATERALjkt is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the loan j granted to firm k in t has collateral and 0 otherwise. DISTANCEkt measures the Km from the capital of the province where the headquarters of the bank is located to the capital of the province where the firm receiving the loan is located. HERFINDAHLt is the index of credit market concentration, equal to the sum of banks squared market shares in loans made in each one of the fifty Spanish provinces in year t. DURATIONk,t-1 is the number of years of lender-borrower relationships before the loan is granted. SHAREkt is the market share of the bank in business loans in the province where the loan is granted. NUMBER OF LENDERSk,t-1 is the number of banks with which the firm has loans at the time the loan is granted. AGEk,t-1 is the number of years since the firm was set up, lagged one year. DEFAULTk,t-1 is a dummy variable with value 1 if the firm k that gets the loan in t had a loan in default in t-1, and 0 otherwise. DEFAULTk,t+1 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm k does not have a loan in default at the time the loan is granted but defaults in the following year. ASSETSkt,-1 is the amount of total assets of the firms. EQUITY/ASSETSkt,-1 proxies for the firm's solvency. INTEREST INCOME/EBITk,t-1 is the coverage of interest expenses by earnings before interest and taxes. ROAk,t-1 is the profit over total assets ratio. LIQUIDITY RATIOkt,-1 is the ratio between cash and total assets. SHORT TERM DEBTkt is firms' debt with a maturity less than one year. SHORT TERM DEBT/CURRENTkt,-1 is the inverse of the current ratio. ASSETS SHORT TERM LOANjkt is a dummy variable that takes one if the loan j has a maturity between one and three years. SHAREkt is the share of the bank in the province where the loan is granted. 9 time dummies, 49 regional dummies, 10 industry dummies and 194 bank dummies included in all models. Robust standard error (SE) to equal correlation within panels shown. ***, **, * mean statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%. Logistic estimation on the determinants of the use of collateral in loans for the pool of data.Time period 1992-2002. COLLATERALjkt is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the loan j granted to firm k in t has collateral, and 0 otherwise. DISTANCEkt measures the Km form the capital of the province where the headquarter of the bank is located to the capital of the province where the firm receiving the loan is located. HERFINDAHLt is the index of credit market concentration, equal to the sum of banks squared market shares in loans made in each one of the fifty Spanish provinces in year t. DURATIONk,t-1 is the number of years of lender-borrower relationships before the loan is granted. SHAREkt is the market share of the bank in business loans in the province where the loan is granted. NUMBER OF LENDERSk,t-1 is the number of banks with which the firm has loans at the time the loan is granted. AGEk,t-1 is the number of years since the firm was set up, lagged one year. DEFAULTk,t-1 is a dummy variable with value 1 if the firm k that gets the loan in t had a loan in default in t-1, and 0 otherwise. DEFAULTk,t+1 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm k does not have a loan in default at the time the loan is granted but defaults in the following year. ASSETSkt,-1 is the amount of total asets of the firms. EQUITY/ASSETSkt,-1 proxies for the firm's solvency. INTEREST INCOME/EBITk,t-1 is the coverage of interest expenses by earnings before interest and taxes. ROAk,t-1 is the profit over total assets ratio. LIQUIDITY RATIOkt,-1 is the ratio between cash and total assets. SHORT TERM DEBTkt is firms' debt with a maturity less than one year. SHORT TERM DEBT/CURRENTkt,-1 is the inverse of the current ratio. ASSETS SHORT TERM LOANjkt is a dummy variable that takes one if the loan j has a maturity between one and three years. SHAREkt is the share of the bank in the province where the loan is granted. 9 time dummies, 49 regional dummies, 10 industry dummies and 194 bank dummies included in all models. Robust standard error (SE) to equal correlation within panels shown. ***, **, * mean statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
